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Mental imagery, seeing with the mind’s eyes, can induce stronger positive as well as
negative affect compared to verbal processing. Given this emotion-amplifying effect, it
appears likely that mental images play an important role in affective disorders. According
to the subcomponents model of depression, depressed mood is maintained by both
negative imagery (which amplifies negative mood) and less efficient positive imagery
processes. Empirical research on the link between mental imagery and affect in clinical
depression, however, is still sparse. This study aimed at testing the role of mental
imagery in depression, using a modified version of the affect misattribution procedure
(AMP) and the self-assessment manikin (SAM) to assess implicit (AMP) and explicit
(SAM) affect elicited by mental images, pictures, and verbal processing in clinically
depressed participants (n=32) compared to healthy controls (n=32). In individuals with
a depressive disorder, compared to healthy controls, negative mental images induced
stronger negative affect in the explicit as well as implicit measure. Negative mental
imagery did not, however, elicit greater increases in explicitly and implicitly assessed
negative affect compared to other processing modalities (verbal processing, pictures) in
the depressed group. Additionally, a positive imagery deficit in depression was observed
in the explicit measure. Interestingly, the two groups did not differ in implicitly assessed
affect after positive imagery, indicating that depressed individuals might benefit from
positive imagery on an implicit or automatic level. Overall, our findings suggest that mental
imagery also plays an important role in depression and confirm the potential of novel
treatment approaches for depression, such as the promotion of positive imagery.
Keywords: depression, mental imagery, implicit affect, implicit measure, affect misattribution procedure
Introduction
Mental images are internal representations “giving rise to the experience of ‘seeing with the mind’s
eye”’ without an appropriate sensory input [Ref. (1) p. 635]. Although we think about situations or
problems using verbal representations (e.g., “I have to call a friend”) and/or mental images (e.g.,
“seeing the friend in our mind’s eye”), previous research and treatment approaches in the context of
depression have focused almost exclusively on the verbal form of thinking (2, 3). Only recently has
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research begun to examine the impact of mental imagery in
depression. Indeed, studies have found that intrusive memories
and images are very common in depression and that these intru-
sions are related to strong emotions, such as sadness or fear,
and high levels of distress (4–6). Additionally, the severity of
depressive symptoms was found to be positively correlated with
the vividness of deliberately generated negativemental images (7).
Deeprose and Holmes (8) developed the impact of future events
scale (IFES), a self-report measure for assessing the consequences
during the previousweek of intrusive images of future personal life
events (e.g., “I had trouble concentrating”). Compared to control
participants, high dysphoric as well as clinically depressed indi-
viduals reported a greater impact of involuntary negative images
of the future (8, 9).
It seems that depression is not only associated with an increase
in negative mental imagery but also with a decrease in positive
mental imagery. In a non-clinical sample as well as in individuals
with clinical depression, depression symptoms were associated
with reduced vividness of images of positive future events (7, 9).
Also, in individuals with higher depression scores compared to
those with lower such scores, imagery of positively interpreted
ambiguous words (e.g., “break”) elicited less pleasure (7).
Previous studies regarding the special link between imagery
and emotion showed that compared to verbal processing, visualiz-
ing emotional scenarios elicits stronger positive as well as negative
affective reactions [e.g., Ref. (10–12)]. Due to this powerful impact
of imagery on emotional states, mental images might be of partic-
ular importance in affective disorders and might critically influ-
ence the affective characteristics of depression (2, 13). Based on
these findings, Holmes et al. (2) have proposed a subcomponents
model of depression, which emphasizes the role of mental imagery
in the amplification and maintenance of depression. The model
suggests that negative mental images can reinforce negative mood
as well as a negative interpretation bias in the presence of ambigu-
ity, which, in turn, can further worsen depressed feelings. Due to
the high levels of negative affect in depression and the emotion-
amplifying effect of mental imagery, mental images might be
“particularly toxic” in depression [Ref. (2) p. 24]. Additionally,
due to the mood-improving effect of positive imagery, deficits in
positive mental images might result in lowered mood and thereby
also maintain depression (2, 14). Systematic empirical research on
these relations and especially investigations of clinical samples,
however, are still sparse.
Furthermore, previous research has almost exclusively relied on
explicit measures for assessing the emotional effects of imagery
(15, 16). Explicitly assessed affect refers to intentional and con-
trollable affective reactions and is usually measured with ques-
tionnaires or self-reports, in the context of mental imagery, for
example, with the positive and negative affect schedule [PANAS;
(17)]. Explicit measures, however, can be strongly affected by
response biases and limited introspection (18). In particular, self-
reports of emotional reactions can be influenced by self-concepts
or beliefs about how specific events supposedly change emo-
tional states (19, 20). Cognitions (verbal or visual) and emotional
responses often arise very rapidly and automatically. Especially
in depression, negative automatic cognitions and uncontrollable
negative emotion are very common (3, 21). Theoretical models
of depression suggest that depressive symptoms can emerge when
automatically triggered implicit processes persist without a reg-
ulating influence of explicit processes (22–24). Indeed, previous
studies have shown that implicit measures can be promising for
the assessment of specific characteristics of depression. Implicitly
assessed affect describes fast, automatic, and uncontrollable affec-
tive responses. Examples for implicit measures are the implicit
association test [IAT; (25)], the extrinsic affective Simon task
[EAST; (26)], and the affect misattribution procedure [AMP;
(27)]. Haeffel et al. (23), for example, found that in contrast to the
explicit measure, only the implicit measure for assessing vulnera-
bility to depression (self-worth IAT) predicted affective responses
to a subsequent distressing task. So, using implicit measures to
investigate characteristics in depressionmight be a very promising
addition to explicit measures. Previous work has examined the
effects of imagery using objective measures, such as the impact
of imagery on physiological reactions (28), neuronal activity (29),
behavior (30), and performance tasks (31), but little is known
about the impact of imagery on implicit affect.
The study by Ceschi et al. (15) represents a first attempt to use
an implicit measure, the IAT, to assess implicit emotion (anxiety)
induced by mental images. Anxious compared to calm or neutral
mental images elicited higher levels of explicitly assessed anxiety.
However, no effect was found for implicit anxiety. The authors
proposed that the IAT measures implicit trait anxiety or the
self-concept of anxiety, instead of affect changes after relatively
short mental images (15, 16). Görgen et al. (16) therefore used
an alternative implicit measure, a modified version of the AMP
(27), to implicitly assess the emotional impact of mental images.
In addition, this was the first study that investigates the relation
between depressive symptoms and implicit affect changes
induced by mental imagery. In this modified AMP (16), negative,
neutral, and positive mental images were used as prime stimuli,
followed by the presentation of an ambiguous stimulus (a Chinese
character). The participants were asked to rate the pleasantness of
the character on a four-point scale andwere specifically instructed
to avoid being affected by the prime stimuli when responding to
the ambiguous stimuli. The principle behind this procedure is a
misattribution effect (27, 32). Participantsmisattribute their affec-
tive reaction caused by the prime stimulus (e.g., a negative picture)
to the presentation of the ambiguous stimulus. If the task is con-
ducted as intended (not to intentionally rate the prime stimuli),
the influence of the prime stimuli on the ratings of the ambiguous
stimuli might be automatic and uncontrollable (27, 33). In this
study by Görgen et al. (16), explicit affect was assessed with
the self-assessment manikin (SAM ratings, valence dimension
from unhappy to happy). The results showed that in the implicit
measure mental imagery elicits more implicit negative affect
than verbal processing. In the explicit measure, mental imagery
compared to verbal processing showed an emotion-amplifying
effect for both, negative and positive affect (experiment 1). The
strong emotional impact of imagery is explained by the close link
between sensory-based information and emotional processing
circuits as well as by similarities of perception and imagery
regarding their neuronal processing in the brain (13). In line with
this explanation, the second experiment by Görgen et al. (16)
showed that neutral and negativemental images are comparable to
pictures in their implicit emotional impact. Compared to positive
pictures, positive imagery induced even stronger implicit positive
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affect. The severity of depressive symptoms was negatively related
to implicit affect after positive mental imagery. Importantly,
implicit affect after positive imagery explained incremental
variance in depressive symptoms beyond explicit affect (16).
To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet investigated the
role of implicitlymeasured affect caused bymental images in clini-
cal depression. The primary aim of the present studywas therefore
to investigate the emotion-amplifying effect of mental imagery
in clinically depressed individuals, using an implicit (AMP) as
well as an explicit measure of affect (SAM). By comparing the
emotional impact of mental images, verbally processed stimuli,
and “real” pictures, we can also determine the specific impact of
mental images.
Testing the subcomponents model of depression (increased
negative imagery with a particularly emotion-amplifying effect
and decreased positive imagery), we postulated the following
hypotheses:
1. Negative mental imagery: In depression, negative imagery elic-
its stronger negative affect than verbally processed negative
stimuli, and comparable negative affect to that of pictures.
2. Positive mental imagery: In depression, positive mental images
might have a comparable emotional impact to verbally pro-
cessed positive stimuli and a significantly lower emotional
impact than positive pictures.
3. Compared to healthy controls: In depression negative imagery
might elicit greater increases in negative affect and positive
imagery might improve the emotional state to a lesser extent.
The findings should be consistent in the explicit and implicit
measure. Initial evidence suggests that the promotion of posi-
tive mental images can reduce depressive symptoms (14, 34, 35).
An interpretation bias modification intervention using positive
imagery was particularly successful in depressed patients who
reported frequent everyday use of mental imagery [spontaneous
use of imagery scale, SUIS; (34, 36)].
4. The everyday use of mental imagery (SUIS) should be posi-
tively correlated with positive affect after positive imagery in
depression.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Outpatient Clinic for Psy-
chotherapy at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, via
press mailing lists, and emails sent to all students and faculty
of the university (see Figure 1). People who responded to the
advertisement or email were first screened over the phone to
determinewhether theymet basic inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The telephone interview included questions of the structured
clinical interview for DSM-IV axis I [SCID-I; (37)] to determine
whether the person might be eligible for the depressed or control
group. Potential participants were invited to the laboratory for a
more extensive interview.
The recruitment and selection procedures as well as the inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria for the depressed group are summa-
rized in Figure 1. The main inclusion criterion for the depressed
group was a current diagnosis of a depressive disorder (major
depression and/or dysthymia) according to the diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders [DSM-IV; (38)]. Important
exclusion criteria were comorbidity of any current other axis I or
II disorder and a current suicidal tendency (for further exclusion
criteria, see Figure 1).
After the telephone screening, only 16% (n= 5) of all vol-
unteers who reported depressive symptoms were invited to the
SCID. Most of the volunteers (n= 15) were excluded, because
they suffered from an additional mental disorder (e.g., suspected
anxiety disorder; see Figure 1). For ethical reasons, we excluded
people with current severe depression who were not receiving
psychotherapeutic support at the time of the telephone screening
(n= 2).
After the screening phase, a total of 40 depressed individuals
were invited to participate in the laboratory session. In these
individual sessions, all diagnoses were first assessed by a trained
and experienced clinical rater using SCID-I and -II (37). Eight
of the 40 depressed individuals were further excluded from the
study. According to the SCID, six participants were found to
have at least one comorbid disorder (e.g., alcohol abuse, panic
disorder, or pain disorder) and two participants were excluded for
other reasons (problems with instructions and incomplete data
recording; see Figure 1). Finally, the depressed group consisted
of 32 participants with the following diagnoses: 22 participants
with recurrent depressive episodes, 5 with a single depressive
episode, 1 with a chronic major depression, 3 with dysthymia, and
1 with a double depression (combination of dysthymia and major
depression). The inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ; first author
and therapist; n= 29) for the SCID-I was κ= 1 for depressive
disorder vs. no depressive disorder and κ= 0.65 for the type of
depressive disorder. Six of the 32 depressed individuals had a
history of another mental disorder (2 with substance abuse, 1 with
alcohol dependency with more than 6 years complete remission, 1
with panic disorder with/without agoraphobia, and 1with bulimia
nervosa). At the time of the SCID, 31% of the depressed people
reported taking antidepressants.
Healthy control participants consisted of individuals who
had no current mental disorder and had never met criteria for
a depressive disorder. In the control group, two participants
were excluded: one person had already participated in a very
similar study (possible practice effect or expectancies about the
emotional impact of the imagery vs. verbal condition) and one
met the DSM-IV criteria for alcohol abuse and hypochondriasis.
Finally, the control group consisted of 32 never-depressed
individuals (κ= 1, n= 24).
The study protocol obtained approval from the ethics com-
mittee of the Psychological Institute of the Johannes Gutenberg
University of Mainz. All participants provided written informed
consent and received monetary compensation for their participa-
tion ($40).
Implicit Measure of Affect: Adapted Affect
Misattribution Procedure
The AMP (27) was modified and three different versions were
developed: mental images, words, and “real” pictures were used as
prime stimuli. First, participants received instructions to generate
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FIGURE 1 | Steps of the recruitment and selection process for the depressed and control groups.
mental images (imagery condition) of the acoustically presented
words, to count the syllables of the words (verbal condition), or
to look at pictures presented in the center of the screen (pic-
ture condition). In the imagery instruction, we defined mental
imagery as follows: “objects or scenes are imagined (by seeing,
hearing, feeling : : :) in the absence of an actual perception.” It
was emphasized that the generated mental images should be as
concrete and vivid as possible. Based on the study by Görgen et al.
(16), which demonstrated reliable results with prime durations of
3 s, participants had 3 s to generate and maintain mental images,
to count syllables, or to look at the presented pictures. Following
the presentation of the prime stimulus, a Chinese pictograph
[randomly selected out of a set of 200 pictographs from Ref. (27)]
was presented in the center of the screen for 200ms. Subsequently,
amask of black andwhite noise was displayed until the participant
rated the ambiguous stimulus on a four-point scale (33): “unpleas-
ant [1],” “rather unpleasant [2],” “rather pleasant [3],” “pleasant
[4].” In the preceding instructions, the participants were explicitly
asked to avert possible impact of the acoustically presented stimuli
on their judgments of the Chinese pictographs. Each version of
the AMP (imagery, counting syllables, and pictures) comprised
three practice trials with neutral stimuli and 60 test trials (10
negative, 10 neutral, and 10 positive words/pictures presented
twice in random order).
Explicit Measure of Affect: Self-Assessment
Manikin
The SAM is a widely used non-verbal, pictorial measurement of
affective responses (39). Following imagery, verbal processing,
and pictures, participants were asked to rate their current emo-
tional state on a five-point scale ranging from unhappy [1] to
happy [5] (SAM valence dimension).
The five-point scale represents a relatively simple response
format and was proved successful in a previously described study
on mental imagery (15). Otherwise, the procedure was identi-
cal to the adapted AMP (including presentation times). As in
the implicit task, each version of the explicit measure (imagery,
counting syllables, and pictures) included three practice trials with
neutral stimuli and 60 test trials (10 negative, 10 neutral, and 10
positive words/pictures presented twice in random order).
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Stimuli
We created 12 lists of words and 6 lists of pictures. In both
the imagery and the verbal conditions, we used two word lists
(implicit and explicit measure) of each valence (negative, neutral,
and positive), resulting in 12 word lists (see Supplementary Mate-
rial). The picture condition included two lists (implicit and explicit
measure) of each valence (negative, neutral, and positive) (see
Supplementary Material). The word stimuli were selected from
the Berlin affective word list reloaded [BAWL-R; (40)], which is
a database of about 3,000 German words with normative ratings
on emotionality (valence), arousal, imageability, and information
about other characteristics, such as frequency in the German lan-
guage.Nounswith valence ratings below 1.3were assigned to the
negative category, between  0.8 and 0.8 to the neutral category,
and above 1.3 to the positive category (seven-point scale ranging
from  3 to +3) (41). To ensure that participants would be able
to generate mental images, we selected words with imageability
ratings4 on a scale ranging from 1 (low imageability) to 7 (high
imageability). All word lists were balanced in terms of image-
ability, word length, number of syllables, and word frequency,
Fs 0.25, ps 0.99 (Welch’s F if the homogeneity of variance
was violated). The picture stimuli were drawn from the inter-
national affective picture system [IAPS; (42)]. To compare word
and picture stimuli, we first standardized the emotionality and
arousal values of the words and pictures. The six lists (imagery,
verbal condition, and pictures, each in the explicit and implicit
measure) of the same valence (see Supplementary Material) did
not differ with regard to emotionality, Fs 0.28, ps 0.92, and
arousal, Fs 0.35, ps 0.88.
Self-Report Data
Depressive Symptoms
The severity of depressive symptoms was assessed with the Beck
depression inventory-II [BDI-II; (43, 44)]. The 21 items based on
the DSM-IV (38) are rated on a four-point scale ranging from 0 to
3. The German version has shown good reliability (α 0.84) and
validity in clinical and non-clinical samples (45). In the present
study, the Cronbach’s α was excellent (α= 0.95).
Measure of Mental Imagery
The SUIS is a self-report measure for assessing the everyday use of
mental imagery (36). We used the extended German version with
17 items, which showed good reliability and validity (46). Items,
such as “When I think about visiting a relative, I almost always
have a clear mental picture of him or her,” are rated on a five-point
scale ranging from 1 (never appropriate) to 5 (always completely
appropriate). In the present study, the SUIS showed an internal
consistency of α= 0.87.
Manipulation Check
To check compliance with the instructions in the experimental
tasks, participants responded to the following questions on a five-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much): “How
much were you able to (a) mentally imagine the presented words,
(b) count the syllables of the words, (c) look at the presented
pictures?” “Howmuch were you able to concentrate on (a) mental
images, (b) counting syllables, (c) looking at the pictures for the
entire time interval?” “How difficult did you find (a) the mental
imagery task, (b) counting syllables, (c) looking at pictures?”
Participants were also asked: “How often did your mental images
include autobiographical memories?”
Procedure
Participants who responded to the advertisement or email took
part in the telephone screening. The advertisement, entitled
“Research on the role of mental imagery in depression,” was
addressed to people who suffered from depressive symptoms, but
had no other psychological problems. In the laboratory, all partici-
pants were tested individually. After giving written informed con-
sent, SCID-I and -II were administered by trained psychologists.
Following the SCID, each participant completed all experimental
tasks: implicit affect after verbal processing, explicit affect after
verbal processing, implicit affect after mental imagery, explicit
affect after mental imagery, implicit affect after pictures, and
explicit affect after pictures. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of two orders either the verbal or the imagery condition
was presented first. Due to the principle of implicit measures of
concealing the intention of the measurement and of assessing
more automatic and unintentional emotional reactions the influ-
ence of implicit measures on subsequent explicit measures might
be smaller than vice versa (16). So, the implicit measure always
preceded the explicit measure. After the experimental tasks, par-
ticipants answered questions regarding socio-demographic data
and manipulation check. Finally, they completed the BDI-II and
the SUIS. A laboratory session lasted about 2.5 h.
Statistical Analyses
In the experimental tasks, we calculated means for each valence
condition. To test hypotheses 1–3, we computed repeated-
measures ANOVAs with group (depressed vs. control) as a
between-subjects factor and condition (verbal processing vs.men-
tal imagery vs. pictures) as well as valence (negative vs. neutral vs.
positive) as within-subject factors. If the assumption of sphericity
was violated, the Greenhouse–Geisser correction is reported. An
alpha level of 0.05 (two-tailed) was adopted. Partial eta-squared
(η2p) was calculated as effect size for ANOVA results and Cohen’s
d as effect size for follow-up t tests. Hypothesis 4 was tested by a
correlation analysis (Pearson test, p < 0.05).
Results
Participant Characteristics and Questionnaire
Data
Demographic characteristics and questionnaire data of the clin-
ically depressed and control groups are presented in Table 1.
The depressed and control groups did not differ with regard
to sex, age, and education. As expected, depressed individuals
reported significantly more depressive symptoms, t(62)= 12.28,
p< 0.001, d= 3.07. The difference in the SUIS did not reach sig-
nificance, t(62)= 1.67, p= 0.100, d= 0.42. Regarding the manip-
ulation check, the two groups did not differ significantly in
their ability to generate mental images (following the imagery
instruction) and in the level of concentration on images and
pictures. In contrast, depressed individuals rated themselves as
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TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics and questionnaire data for the
clinically depressed and control groups.
Variables DG (N=32) CG (N= 32) Statistics
(df)
Effect
size
M (SD) M (SD)
Female, n (%) 21 (66%) 24 (75%) 0:67 (1) 0.10
Age (years) 36:13 (12:68) 38:38 (12:32)  0:72 (62) 0.18
Higher education, n (%) 23 (72%) 24 (75%) 0:08 (1) 0.04
BDI-II 20:66 (7:83) 2:09 (3:44) 12:28 (62)** 3.07
SUIS-17 53:91 (12:31) 48:81 (12:06) 1:67 (62) 0.42
Manipulation check
Mental imagery
Ability 4:12 (0:75) 4:22 (0:66)  0:53 (62) 0.14
Concentration 3:50 (0:84) 3:72 (0:73)  1:11 (62) 0.28
Difficulty 2:63 (1:01) 1:87 (0:98) 3:02 (62)** 0.76
Autobiographical 3:09 (1:20) 3:00 (0:98) 0:34 (62) 0.08
Counting syllables
Ability 3:47 (1:11) 4:19 (1:00)  2:73 (62)** 0.68
Concentration 2:66 (1:00) 3:78 (1:16)  4:16 (62)** 1.03
Difficulty 2:47 (1:27) 1:81 (1:18) 2:15 (62)* 0.54
Looking at pictures
Ability 3:91 (0:89) 4:38 (0:83)  2:17 (62)* 0.55
Concentration 3:66 (1:34) 3:44 (1:13) 0:71 (62) 0.18
Difficulty 3:19 (1:12) 2:44 (1:19) 2:60 (62)* 0.65
DG, depressed group; CG, control group; M, mean; SD, standard deviation; BDI-II, Beck
depression inventory-II; SUIS-17, The German 17-item version of the spontaneous use of
imagery scale.
For dichotomous variables, we calculated the chi-squared test with w as the effect size
estimation (47). For continuous variables, the results of sample t tests with Cohen’s d as
effect size are reported.
*p<0.05.
**p< 0.01.
less able to count syllables, t(62)= 2.73, p< 0.01, d= 0.68, and
to look at the presented pictures, t(62)= 2.17, p< 0.05, d= 0.55,
and reported lower levels of concentration on counting syllables,
t(62)= 4.16, p< 0.001,d= 1.03. Furthermore, depressed partic-
ipants rated all tasks as significantly more difficult, t(62) 2.15,
ps 0.036, ds 0.54. In both groups, autobiographical events
were often included in mental images, t(62)= 0.34, p= 0.734,
d= 0.08.
Explicit Affect (SAM)
The internal consistencies for the SAM ratings were excellent,
ranging from α= 0.91 (positive pictures) to α= 0.98 (negative
pictures and counting syllables of negative words). A 2 (group:
depressed vs. control) 3 (condition: mental imagery vs. verbal
processing vs. pictures) 3 (valence: negative vs. neutral vs. posi-
tive) repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant main effects
of group, F(1, 62)= 29.89, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:33 (DG<CG),
of condition, F(2, 124)= 3.48, p< 0.05, η2p = 0:05 (pic-
tures< verbal), and of valence, F(1.09, 67.30)= 93.30, p< 0.001,
η
2
p = 0:60 (neg< neu< pos). Additionally, we found signifi-
cant interactions of group by valence, F(2, 124)= 6.40, p< 0.01,
η
2
p = 0:09; and condition by valence, F(2.42, 149.81)= 16.87,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0:21: These effects, however, were quali-
fied by a three-way group by condition by valence interaction,
F(4, 248)= 3.33, p< 0.05, η2p = 0:05:
To further test the hypotheses (i.e., the emotion-amplifying
effect of mental imagery in depression) and to clarify this
three-way interaction, we computed separate 3 (condition) 3
(valence) ANOVAs for each group. In the depressed group,
the ANOVA showed a significant interaction of condition by
valence, F(2.89, 89.57)= 14.37, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:32: In con-
trast to hypothesis 1, mental imagery and verbal processing
of negative stimuli did not differ significantly regarding their
emotional impact, t(31)= 0.15, p= 0.882, d= 0.02, and nega-
tive pictures elicited significantly greater increases in negative
affect than negative imagery, t(31)= 4.39, p< 0.001, d= 0.52.
Consistent with hypothesis 2, we found no significant differ-
ence in the emotional responses to positive imagery and ver-
bally processed positive stimuli, t(31)= 0.50, p= 0.623, d= 0.06,
and positive pictures elicited stronger positive affect than posi-
tive mental images, t(31)= 3.25, p< 0.01, d= 0.38. Comparing
pictures and verbal processing, negative and positive pictures
elicited more negative and positive affect than verbally processed
negative and positive stimuli, ts(31) 3.83, ps 0.01, ds 0.47.
For neutral stimuli, there were no significant differences between
the conditions, ts(31) 1.24, ps 0.23, ds 0.17. Means of the
affective ratings after verbal processing, mental imagery and
looking at pictures for the depressed group are illustrated in
Figure 2.
In the control group, we also found a significant interaction of
condition by valence, F(1.90, 58.95)= 6.54, p< 0.01, η2p = 0:17:
In line with the emotion-amplifying effect ofmental imagery, pos-
itive mental images elicited stronger positive affect than positive
stimuli in the verbal condition, t(31)= 2.22, p< 0.05, d= 0.25,
and negative imagery elicitedmarginallymore negative affect than
negative stimuli in the verbal condition, t(31)= 1.94, p= 0.061,
d= 0.30. Negative as well as positive mental images and pictures
did not differ in their emotional impact, ts(31) 1.09, ps 0.284,
ds 0.17. Additionally, negative pictures induced more nega-
tive affect than verbally processed negative stimuli, t(31)= 4.56,
p< 0.001, d= 0.49, and positive pictures more positive affect
than verbally processed positive stimuli, t(31)= 2.08, p< 0.05,
d= 0.20. Regarding neutral stimuli, the neutral pictures elicited
more negative affect than the verbal processing of neutral stimuli,
t(31)= 2.36, p< 0.05, d= 0.23, and marginally more negative
affect than neutral mental images, t(31)= 1.88, p= 0.07, d= 0.20.
Figure 3 illustrates the means of affective ratings after verbal
processing, mental imagery, and looking at pictures for the con-
trol group and Figure 4 shows the comparison of both groups
regarding negative, neutral, and positive stimuli pooled for the
conditions.
The means (see also Figure 4) suggest that the effects between
the depressed and control group might be stronger for negative
than for positive stimuli (interaction of group by valence). So,
we additionally considered separate ANOVAs for each condi-
tion to clarify the three-way interaction. In the mental imagery
condition, there were only significant main effects of group,
F(1, 62)= 25.63, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:29 (DG<CG), and valence,
F(1.13, 69.86)= 64.94, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:51 (neg< neu< pos).
Regarding the verbal condition, the main effects of group,
F(1, 62)= 28.87, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:32 (DG<CG), and valence,
F(1.15, 71.47)= 46.39, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:43 (neg< neu< pos),
as well as the interaction of group by valence were signif-
icant, F(2, 124)= 7.24, p< 0.01, η2p = 0:11: The effect
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FIGURE 2 |Means and SEs of the explicit (SAM, scale: 1–5) and implicit affect ratings (AMP, scale: 1–4) after verbal processing (counting syllables),
mental imagery, and looking at pictures of negative, neutral, and positive stimuli for the depressed group (DG). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
FIGURE 3 |Means and SEs of the explicit (SAM, scale: 1–5) and implicit affect ratings (AMP, scale: 1–4) after verbal processing (counting syllables),
mental imagery, and looking at pictures of negative, neutral, and positive stimuli for the control group (CG). p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
sizes for the difference between both groups were larger for
negative (p< 0.001, d= 1.33) and neutral (p< 0.001, d= 1.19)
than for positive stimuli (p< 0.05, d= 0.65). In the picture con-
dition, there were also significant main effects of group, F(1,
62)= 23.47, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:28 (DG<CG), and valence,
F(1.17, 72.20)= 113.00, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:65 (neg< neu< pos),
as well as a significant interaction of group by valence, F(2,
124)= 8.86, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:13: Similar to the verbal condition,
affective reactions to negative (p< 0.001, d= 1.23) and neutral
stimuli (p< 0.001, d= 0.97) were more negative in depression,
whereas the two groups did not differ regarding positive stimuli
(p= 0.11, d= 0.40).
In accordance with hypothesis 3, in the depressed compared
to the control group, negative imagery elicited significantly lower
affect, t(62)= 3.85, p< 0.001, d= 0.96, and emotional responses
to positive imagery were significantly reduced, t(62)= 3.15,
p< 0.01, d= 0.79.
Implicit Affect (AMP)
The internal consistencies of the AMP were all acceptable
to good, ranging from α= 0.73 (counting syllables of neu-
tral words) to α= 0.92 (negative pictures). For implicit affect,
the 2 (group) 3 (condition) 3 (valence) repeated-measures
ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of group, F(1,
62)= 16.65, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:21 (DG<CG), a marginally
significant effect of condition, F(1.80, 111.32)= 3.13, p= 0.053,
η
2
p = 0:05 (pictures< verbal), and a significant effect of valence,
F(1.17, 72.58)= 21.83, p< 0.001, η2p = 0:26 (neg< neu< pos).
These effects were qualified by a significant interaction of group
by valence, F(2, 124)= 5.93, p< 0.01, η2p = 0:09:The interactions
of groupby condition,F(2, 124)= 2.58, p= 0.080,η2p = 0:04; con-
dition by valence, F(3.25, 201.58)= 1.68, p= 0.156, η2p = 0:03;
and the three-way interaction of condition by valence by group,
F(4, 248)= 1.78, p= 0.133, η2p = 0:03; did not reach significance.
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FIGURE 4 |Means and SEs of the explicit (SAM, scale: 1–5) and implicit affect ratings (AMP, scale: 1–4) after negative, neutral, and positive stimuli
(pooled for the conditions) for the depressed (DG) and control group (CG). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; d=Cohen’s d (effect size).
Compared to control participants, in depressed individuals, neg-
ative and neutral stimuli induced significantly stronger implicit
negative affect, ts(62) 2.81, ps 0.007, ds 0.71, whereas the
two groups did not differ regarding positive stimuli, t(62)= 1.40,
p= 0.168, d= 0.35. Means of the affective ratings after verbal pro-
cessing, mental imagery and looking at pictures for the depressed
and control groups are illustrated in Figures 2–4.
Association Between the SUIS and Positive
Imagery in Depression
Among people with a depressive disorder, the everyday use of
mental imagery (SUIS) was significantly positively correlated
with implicitly assessed affect after positive imagery (r= 0.38,
p< 0.05), but not with explicitly assessed positive affect after
positive imagery (r= 0.21, p= 0.256; hypothesis 4). In the control
group, both relationships did not reach significance (implicit:
r= 0.14, p= 0.45; explicit: r= 0.32, p= 0.07). The relationships
between the SUIS and implicitly assessed positive affect after
positive mental imagery for the depressed and control groups are
illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.
Discussion
Mental imagery is proposed to play an important role in the
amplification and maintenance of depressed mood (2). Few stud-
ies, however, have examined this link in clinical depression. The
primary aim of the present study was to examine the affective
consequences of mental imagery using an implicit as well as an
explicit measure. By comparing the emotional impact of mental
images, verbally processed stimuli, and “real” pictures, we could
also determine the specific impact of mental images.
In contrast to the control group, individuals with a depres-
sive disorder did not exhibit an emotion-amplifying effect of
mental imagery compared to verbal processing. Pictures induced
the strongest explicitly assessed affect in depression. Due to the
missing emotion-amplifying effect of mental imagery in depres-
sion compared to the other processing modalities, we could not
FIGURE 5 | Scatter plot for the depressed group with the habitual use
of mental imagery assessed with the spontaneous use of imagery
scale (SUIS) on the x-axis and the implicit positive affectivity (AMP,
scale: 1–4) after positive mental imagery on the y-axis.
confirm that mental images are “particularly toxic” in depres-
sion [Ref. (2) p. 24]. Compared with the explicit measure, the
ANOVA for the implicit measure showed no significant three-way
interaction of group by condition by valence. This finding might
be attributed to generally smaller effects in the implicit measure
and consequent difficulties in detecting significant results in the
overall analysis.
There are several possible explanations for the findings that
mental imagery had no emotion-amplifying effect compared to
verbal processing and that pictures were particularly emotion-
amplifying in depression (specifically for depression in the
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FIGURE 6 | Scatter plot for the control group with the habitual use of
mental imagery assessed with the spontaneous use of imagery scale
(SUIS) on the x-axis and the implicit positive affectivity (AMP, scale:
1–4) after positive mental imagery on the y-axis.
explicit measure). To generate mental images (e.g., of “vacation”),
memories are retrieved from long-termmemory (29) andworking
memory then plays a crucial role in maintaining and modifying
these mental images (48). Previous work has related negative
affect and depression to impaired working memory performance,
a finding that could be explained by two assumptions (49, 50):
negative feelings and emotion-regulation processes require cogni-
tive resources [resource allocation model (51)] and/or depression
may be associated with deficits in the use of spontaneous response
strategies (52). Individuals with depressive symptoms clearly ben-
efited from directed strategies regarding their performance in a
memory task (52). In addition, previous studies have found that
depressed individuals report significantly fewer specificmemories
(53). Generic memories and images may result in less intense
emotional reactions (53, 54). Indeed, in this study, depressed indi-
viduals rated the generation of mental images as more difficult or
demanding than did control participants. The retrieval of generic
memoriesmay also represent an emotion–regulation or avoidance
mechanism, particularly to avoid further mood deterioration (53,
55). In addition, verbal processing may trigger a ruminative-
thinking style in depression (56, 57), which reinforces negative
affect and may have an emotional impact comparable to that of
mental imagery.
An additional explanation for the reduced emotional impact
of mental imagery in depression, especially for the less efficient
positive imagery processes, might be that mental images trig-
ger increased self-focus and comparisons with a more positive
past or happier people. This discrepancy might hinder mood
improvement or the mood improvement might be very transient
(58). Indeed, our findings support this assumption. In depressed
participants, positive mental images elicited significantly stronger
implicitly assessed positive affect than did positive pictures. Addi-
tionally, in the implicit measure, the benefit of positive imagery
was comparable in the two groups, indicating that depressed
individuals may benefit from positive imagery on an automatic
or implicit level.
Interestingly, increases in negative affect in depression com-
pared to healthy controls were observed in both the explicit
and implicit measure. In contrast, decreased positive affect in
depression was only found in the explicit measure. These find-
ings suggest that deficits in the processing of positive material,
which were observed in depression [e.g., Ref. (59, 60)] may be
related to decreased elaboration and shallow levels of processing
during confrontingwith positivematerial. In this regard, our study
also extends previous studies on implicit processes in depression,
because most studies have focused onmemory and attention [e.g.,
Ref. (59)] and only little research has concentrated on the emo-
tional impact onmood and hedonic perception, aspects which are
crucial in the context of depression.
Concerning the habitual use of mental imagery, we found a
positive correlation between the everyday use of mental imagery
and implicit positive affect after positive imagery in patients
with depression. It is possible that practice could promote the
benefit of positive imagery in depression or that depressed indi-
viduals who show more positive affect after positive imagery
make an attempt to harness this in everyday life. Due to the
correlational nature of this finding, we cannot draw any causal
conclusions at this stage. However, overall, our results concern-
ing positive imagery suggest both that the promotion of pleas-
ant imagery may be a promising treatment intervention and
that there is potential in depressed people to benefit from pos-
itive imagery (2, 34). Using an imagery-based cognitive inter-
pretation modification (CBM) paradigm, Lang et al. (34) found
that depressed individuals who had practiced positive imagery
showed a significant reduction of intrusions and depressive symp-
toms from pre- to post-treatment. Our results also suggest that
such interventions might benefit from practicing the vividness
of positive imagery and from frequent everyday use of vivid
positive imagery. For example, Werner-Seidler and Moulds (61)
recently demonstrated that depressed individuals who practice
a concrete processing style benefit from the retrieval of positive
memories.
Furthermore, the overall lower emotional responses in the
depressed group could reflect a differently calibrated neutral
point in hedonic detection in depression. According to Baddeley
(62), depression could be characterized by an inappropriate high-
neutral point in the hedonic detection system, which is related
to a pessimistic outlook and negative responses. Consistent with
the preponderance of mood-congruent memories in depression
(63), the heightened neutral point could be associated with a
preferential retrieval of negative information, resulting in the
reinforcement of depressedmood (62). These lower affective reac-
tions in depression, respectively, the differences between both
groups were larger regarding negative and neutral stimuli than
positive stimuli. This finding is in accordance with theoretical
models of depression [e.g., Beck’s cognitive theory, Ref. (3)] and
previous studies suggesting that depression is associated with a
deeper processing of negative stimuli, deficits in controlling and
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disengaging from negative information, and a negative interpre-
tation bias of ambiguous stimuli (55, 64).
Study Limitations and Future Research
The mechanism that is responsible for the AMP effect is currently
being discussed (32, 65–67). Some authors assume that the AMP
effect can be better explained as a semantic misattribution than
as an affective misattribution (66). In contrast, Gawronski and
Ye (32) demonstrated that the AMP is able to assess implicit
affect as well. Regarding the role of intention and awareness, the
psychometric quality of the AMP was higher when participants
reported on intentional ratings of the prime stimuli instead of the
Chinese characters (65). Payne et al. (67) criticized the conclusions
by Bar-Anan and Nosek (65) by arguing, for example, that self-
reports are less appropriate for assessing the cause of participants’
reactions.
A previous study found that the latency to generate mental
images was significantly longer for individuals with depressed
mood compared to control participants (68). Although our results
show no differences between the depressed and control group
regarding the reported ability to generate mental images and to
concentrate on mental images for the entire time period (see
Table 1), we cannot rule out the possibility that the time dura-
tion for generating mental images might have been too short
for people with depression. The comparatively rapid sequence
of the AMP requires relatively short prime stimuli. So, the time
of 3 s was a tradeoff between brevity (in order to assess auto-
matic and spontaneous affective priming effects in the AMP)
and the minimum of time necessary to generate a mental
image.
In the verbal condition used by Holmes and colleagues (10,
69), participants were asked to focus on the meaning of the
presented descriptions, which lasted about 10–13 s. In contrast,
the comparatively rapid sequence of events in the AMP requires
relatively short prime stimuli. While focusing on the meaning of
only single words (compared to more complex scenes) for 3 s, it
could be that mental images spontaneously pop up in the mind.
So, counting syllables seemed very promising in the context of the
AMP. However, the counting syllables task requires rather shallow
processing and imposed rather low cognitive load. So, we cannot
rule out that these differences between the tasks influenced the
results.
In the picture condition, participants were generally instructed
to look at and concentrate on the presented pictures. Besides
the questions concerning ability, concentration, and difficulty,
we have no more information in which manner participants
conducted this task (e.g., focusing on their meaning or on
picture characteristics). So, it would have been interesting to
investigate if people (e.g., with higher depression scores) pro-
cess pictures differently (that might have an influence on our
results).
A relatively low number of trials were presented in the implicit
as well as explicit measure: 20 trials per condition and valence.
In addition, due to the overall analyses with three factors and
multiple levels [2 (group: DG vs. CG) 3 (condition: mental
imagery vs. verbal processing vs. pictures) 3 (valence: negative
vs. neutral vs. positive)] the study might be limited to detect
(more) clear differences between the groups and conditions.
Furthermore, some previous studies varied the observer per-
spective of the created mental images (12, 69). Holmes et al. (69)
found that compared to an observer perspective, the field per-
spective (seeing with one’s own eyes) caused more positive affect
after positive mental imagery. In future studies, it would be very
interesting to systematically investigate the effects of the observer
perspective of negative and positive mental imagery in clinical
depression. Given an emotional dampening effect of the observer
perspective, it could be beneficial if people with depression use an
observer perspective for negative events, but a field perspective for
positive events (69).
Future research should test our findings using other experimen-
tal tasks to rule out an effect of the specific method. Specifically,
the result that depressed and healthy control individuals experi-
enced comparable implicit affect after positive imagery should be
tested with an alternative implicit method. A further issue worth
studying is whether depressed individuals suppress (concrete)
negative mental images, reflecting an avoidance mechanism in
depression comparable to the avoidance theory of worry in the
context of generalized anxiety disorder (70). Additionally, the
use of imagery techniques seems to present a further promis-
ing treatment intervention for depression (34), which would be
worthwhile to investigate further and to improve (for example, by
promoting vividness).
In sum, evidence for an emotion-amplifying effect of men-
tal imagery compared to verbal processing was only found in
the control group, but not in individuals with depression. Thus,
the especially “toxic” effect of mental imagery compared to
other processing modalities in depression could not be con-
firmed. On an implicit or automatic level, depressed individuals
benefited from positive imagery comparable to control partic-
ipants. This benefit was found particularly in depressed indi-
viduals with frequent everyday use of mental imagery. Our
results suggest that cognitive–behavioral interventions in the
treatment of depression, which often include the modifica-
tion of negative verbal cognitions, might benefit from addi-
tional imagery techniques, particularly the promotion of positive
imagery (2, 34).
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